

# ANALYSIS

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## LENIN'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION

By G. A. PAUL

"**A**RE our sensations *copies* of bodies and things, or are bodies *complexes* of our sensations?" This for Lenin is "the fundamental question of the theory of knowledge" (p. 146), and he makes it the main topic of his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*,<sup>1</sup> because he holds that as people differ in giving an "idealist" or a "materialist" answer to it so they will tend to differ in whether they take a reactionary or a progressive attitude to questions of practical importance. He is particularly concerned with three points:—

(1) It is established by scientists that inanimate matter was in existence before there were any living creatures at all; and it is inconsistent with this, he holds, to suppose that bodies are complexes of our sensations. Now if people are led by their philosophy to deny a scientific fact so well attested as this one, there will be no end to their tinkering with scientific conclusions in general with a consequent loss of respect for careful examination of things as a way of finding out about them.

(2) This loss of confidence will be most felt in any field where the facts are difficult to muster and where consequently conclusions are difficult to establish. In particular it will be felt regarding attempts to find laws according to which changes take place in the organisation of human beings in groups—laws of a kind Lenin is anxious to find and use to alter some of the existing ways of organisation.

(3) He wishes to combat metaphysical (and in particular

<sup>1</sup> English translation from the Russian, Martin Lawrence Ltd. I have freely italicised those parts of quotations, to which I wished to draw attention, and hope that I have not in any case altered the sense by doing so.

religious) speculation in order that people may turn rather to bettering the world about them—gaining control of it by looking for laws which it obeys, rather than spinning fancies which may persuade themselves and others that it is really other than common knowledge and science take it to be.

So he tries to find the theory of knowledge nearest to common sense and giving least ground for speculative building—a theory which by showing how our knowledge is acquired will show about what things we do know and about what things we cannot know. Thus he insists that his theory of knowledge is just that contained in the simple, robust common sense of the ordinary person—the workman, the housewife, the scientist; and that it is a plain, straightforward theory in contrast with the sophisticated, finely spun fantasies of bourgeois professors. “The ‘naïve’ belief of mankind is consciously taken by materialism as its theory of knowledge” he says (p. 47), and later he speaks of materialism as “an inference, which all of us draw in practical life and which lies at the basis of a ‘practical’ theory of knowledge.” “Its fundamental belief” he goes on (p. 78) “is that *outside of us and independently of us there exist objects, things, and bodies*: that our perceptions are *images of the outer world*. The converse theorem of Mach (bodies are complexes of sensations) is nothing but sheer idealistic foolishness.”

He is taking, we see, a representative theory of perception, and he claims that “in practical life,” this theory is *used* by “all of us”. The chief points of his theory are:—

- (1) *Outside us there are material things.*
- (2) *They exist independently of us.*
- (3) We can get to *know* the nature of any material thing, and sometimes we do so.
- (4) The *means* by which we get to know the nature of a material thing *outside us* is our having *inside us* a sense-perception which *represents*<sup>2</sup> the material thing.

It is not the aim of this paper to deny that these statements express a theory which gives a correct description of what and how we perceive, nor yet to agree that they do: we shall try, rather, to see whether they do play any part in ordinary life and science, and if so what it is.

<sup>2</sup> His most common expression is that inside us we have an *image* which is a *reflection* of the thing outside.

Do they play, for example, the part of a simple description of how something works? Do they act as a description of how the human perceiving apparatus works? Let us compare them with some such simple description or theory and see how alike or different the two are. We might choose to compare them with a simple theory of how certain areas of Britain come to be so much wetter than others, how lack of sun brings about ill-health, how grain goes into a mill at one end and comes out as flour at the other, and so on: but it will be more useful to compare it with an explanation of an occurrence very similar in important respects to this one which Lenin puts forward of how people manage to see things outside themselves—so similar in fact that the two can be expressed in almost the same words. Just as Lenin asks “How do people see things outside themselves?” so one may ask “How do people see things out of submarines?” People from time to time move about some distance below the surface of the sea in an opaque container: their activities are made possible by a contrivance which enables them to look out while the container is submerged and see what is above the surface of the sea for some distance round. The nature of the contrivance needs some explanation; and one may be told that they see out of a submerged submarine “by having in a mirror inside the submarine an image which is an accurate reflection of the things outside it”, just as Lenin would explain that we see material things outside us “by having inside us an image which is an accurate reflection of the things outside us”. We often see things by their reflections in mirrors, so we know what this is, and it has now been explained that seeing out of submarines is a case of it: we now understand, for example, that they do not see out by having a window through which they look directly, and that they do not have an electrical arrangement whereby a sensitive instrument floating on the surface is connected only by wires to the submerged submarine and a picture produced on a fluorescent screen, and so on. Further, we could demand a more particular account of the arrangement of the parts of this mechanism, and, if we were at all in doubt of its being as described, we could go and examine the mechanism for ourselves, see whether it did contain a mirror, whether the mirror was so placed that it would in fact reflect the things above to a person below, and any other matter we cared. We could also assure ourselves, quite

independently of examining the mechanism by which an accurate view of the things is achieved, that it *is* achieved : we could do this, for example, by looking at the view produced by the instrument and comparing what we see there with what we see on coming immediately to the surface.<sup>3</sup>

Now compare Lenin's account of how we see things outside of us with this account of how people in submarines see things on the surface of the water. We have, he says, inside us an *image* ; compare, " they have inside the submarine an *image in a mirror* " : and this image inside us is a *reflection* of things outside us ; compare, " and this image in the mirror inside the submarine is a *reflection* of things outside it " : and, whether in a given case this reflection (in the mind) is an *accurate* representation of the things outside us, *we can find out* ; compare, " and, whether in a given case this reflection (in the submarine) is an *accurate* representation of things outside it, *we can find out* : " that is, we see material things outside us *indirectly*, as distinct from directly ; compare, " that is, people see things outside the submarine *indirectly*, as distinct from seeing them directly (e.g., through a glass port-hole) " .

Let us examine the points of comparison.

Lenin says we have inside us an *image* which represents the object. What kind of image does he mean ? He does not mean that it is an *image in a mirror* inside us : for who would wish to say there is a mirror in the mind ? and certainly no one has ever found one there. Nor does he mean an image as when we say " Conjure up an image of Jones coming through that door over there," i.e. a *mental image* : for Lenin does not wish to say that having a mental image of Jones is just the same as seeing Jones ; nor yet that whenever I see Jones I must also be having a mental image of him. He is not claiming to have noticed that my seeing Jones is made possible by another familiar process going on in my mind at the same time, viz. my having a mental image of him, as it is claimed that seeing out of submarines is

<sup>3</sup> It is of great importance to notice this point that we can, and commonly do, find out whether a reflection or a picture is an accurate reproduction of a thing without knowing at all the working of the process by which it was produced. For example, we need know nothing of the laws governing the behaviour of light to be able to tell whether a reflection of a given thing in a mirror is a good one or not; and we can find out that my camera takes distorted pictures and yours good ones without knowing what is wrong with mine but not with yours, and in fact without having any notion at all of the physical and chemical processes involved in photography.

made possible by there being in the submarine a mirror-image of what is outside. For he does not wish either to say there is no difference between having a mental image of Jones and seeing Jones, or to say that when I see Jones I must also be having a mental image of him.<sup>4</sup> In any ordinary use of the word "image" we know how to tell whether a person has an image in his mind or not; but Lenin uses it without saying how we are to tell whether when we see a material thing we do have an image in our mind or not: he, who insists that everything be found by investigation, gives us no hint of how by investigation we are to find out *this* simple fact. Thus, so far, by contrast with our explanation of seeing out of submarines, we do not even know how to find out whether it is a true description of how we see, and it is of no use to us as the other might be—the other gives us directions for making, and repairing (etc.) contrivances for seeing out of closed bodies, but this gives us no idea at all of what we should have to do to see out of closed minds.

Again, we tell whether what we see is a *reflection* or the thing itself by seeing how it alters in appearance as we move or as it moves, by finding whether on touching it we touch a smooth reflecting surface or an object of the sort we take ourselves to be looking at, and so on. The usefulness of the submarine explanation lies partly in our being able to find the reflecting surface, and see that the image is a reflection as distinct from, say, an image on a fluorescent screen produced electrically. But, again, Lenin's words, though similar in appearance, grammatical form, context, way of being said, etc., to the submarine explanation, differ in that they lack this usefulness. It is not their purpose to direct us, if we wish, to a reflecting surface in the mind.

Now, it may be said, you must not take what Lenin says too literally: the point of his remarks is not to tell one the mechanism by which human beings perceive what is outside them, but to bring out *just one particular likeness* between an entity in the mind which enables us to see outside it, and mental images and

<sup>4</sup> It might be thought that Lenin could be defended in this matter on the grounds that his real point is that both when we have a mental image and when we see a thing we have in the mind an entity—let us call it a sense-datum—which is in itself neither a mental image nor a material thing; and that whether we are at that moment having a mental image or seeing a thing is dependent not on that sense-datum alone, but also on what comes before and after it. But this view is not expressed by Lenin.

reflections, viz. the fact that just as mental images and reflections are *representations* (as it were, *pictures, likenesses*) of what is imaged or reflected so the sense-perception is a representation, a likeness of the thing seen. We may, for example, just before meeting Smith, whom we have not seen for some time, have an image of him as we expect to see him; and on his entrance be able to decide whether it was a good or a bad representation. Similarly with an image in a mirror, or with a painted picture of a thing, or with a photograph, we can compare it for likeness with the original. Now Lenin asserts not only that our sense-perceptions<sup>6</sup> of things are likenesses of them, but, also that we can (if we care to) get to know in which cases the likeness is a good one and in which cases bad: i.e., he asserts that we are able to compare the sense-perception with the thing it purports to represent to us. So let us now consider the notion that in perceiving material things what we are face to face with is not a part of thing or of its surface, but an entity which, *though not part of it, is comparable with it*. This gives us chiefly the idea of comparing as in comparing a photograph with the original, a reflection in a mirror with the thing reflected, a portrait with the sitter, a mental image of Jones with Jones, etc., and the idea of holding a picture up beside the thing pictured, i.e. holding the sense-perception up beside the material thing perceived. Here again, as in the earlier cases of *images* and *reflections*, we cannot press the analogy: we do not hold sense-perceptions up beside things in order to compare them; but Lenin does not think we do, and it will again be said: You are being too crude; you have taken only the most obvious way of comparing two things; there are other ways of comparing than by holding the one thing beside the other (for example there is comparing two things by memory, two heights with a footrule, and so on), and it will be some way not so crudely inapplicable that Lenin is meaning. We can soon see if this is so, for by good fortune we have Lenin's answer to this general objection that we can never, on his theory, get to know what the characteristics of a material thing are because we have no way of comparing it with a sense-perception. It is also Engels' answer, for Lenin quotes from him (p. 83): "... this line of reasoning seems hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation there was action. And

<sup>6</sup> This is the word used in the translation of his book.



human action had solved the difficulty before human ingenuity had invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn these objects to our own use, according to the qualities we perceive in them, *we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions*. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, *if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves*." Lenin now remarks "The materialist theory then, the *reflection of objects by our mind*, is here presented with perfect clearness: things exist outside of us. Our perceptions and representations are their images. The verification of these images, *the distinction of true and false images, is given by practice*."<sup>6</sup> He then continues the quotation from Engels: "... whenever we find ourselves face to face with a failure, then . . . generally . . . we find that the perception upon which we acted was either incomplete and superficial, or combined with the results of other perceptions in a way not warranted by them. . . . So long as we take care to train and to use our senses properly, and to keep our action within the limits prescribed by perceptions properly made and properly used, so long shall we find that the result of our action *PROVES the conformity of our perceptions with the objective nature of the things perceived*. Not in one single instance, so far, have we been led to the conclusion that our sense-perceptions, scientifically controlled, induce in our minds ideas respecting the outer world that are, by their very nature, at variance with reality, or that there is an inherent incompatibility between the outer world and our sense-perceptions of it." Now we see what Lenin's method of comparing is: it is, he says, by getting nearer a thing of whose nature we are uncertain, by touching it, and trying to use it in various ways that we compare our original sense-perception with the thing. But will this do? There is in it something which most of us who disagree with Lenin would not think of denying, viz.

<sup>6</sup> Notice how Engels notices no difference between: (1) "the correctness of our sense-perceptions," on the one hand, and (2) "the agreement of the object with our idea of it," "the agreement of reality outside us with our perceptions of it" on the other. And how Lenin in turn marks no difference between (2) and: (3) "the reflection of objects by our mind", "our perceptions are their images."

that the way to find out whether one has seen a thing right, if one is in doubt, is to get nearer and try to touch it, pick it up, use it, etc.: E.g., there may be a dish of fruit before me: my hosts are known practical jokers: are those real apples or not? I cannot tell by looking only, or even by picking one up, but must try biting one. (I can only find out their nature through practice.) Or again, is that a pen on my desk or just a shadow; I tell by what I feel on putting out my hand.

I.e., by further activity I tell whether I was right or wrong in taking there to be a pen there, or the apples to be real ones. But this is a very different thing from saying—as Lenin and Engels do—that by this I tell whether my original perception was an accurate or inaccurate “reflection” of the thing, a “true or a false image”. Instead of saying only that by further activity we prove our original perception correct or incorrect, they try to give an explanation of what a perception’s being correct or incorrect consists in, viz. in its being an accurate “reflection”, or a “true image” of the thing; and this theory, they say, though difficult to prove by “mere argumentation”, is in fact *believed* by everyone and constantly *used* by them. Compare it now with the explanation that people see out of submarines by a reflecting mirror: this may be *used* to build a similar instrument, to enable one to repair one’s submarine if one ceases to be able to see out of it, to know where to damage a submarine to prevent the people seeing out of it, and so on; but no one can repair anything, or build anything, or prevent anything with the help of the assertion that, when practice shows that we are seeing rightly, we do the seeing by having in the mind a reflection of the thing seen.

Again in the submarine case there is both what we shall call a *direct* and an *indirect* method of comparing the reflection with the thing reflected. We can compare it by looking from the one to the other, or, indirectly, by cruising about on the assumption that the two would be alike *if* we compared them directly: if this cruise is successful in that we reach our destination having circumvented the things seen by means of the periscope, let us say that they and the image in the mirror have been shown to be *indirectly comparable*. Now Lenin’s account of perception allows only of *indirect comparison* of the reflection and the thing: there is no mention of any direct comparison of them. So what is the use of saying: “Success in practice shows us that in this case our



perception was a reflection of the thing" when there is no independent way of finding whether there is a reflection or not? It is as if someone were to say: "So their success in the manoeuvres shows that they had a periscope," but were using "had a periscope" in such a way that it was to be true that they had a periscope if they succeeded in the manoeuvres, and that they had none if they didn't, and no further investigation was to be relevant to whether they had or not; i.e., if they were using it in such a way that it would still be true that "they had a periscope" even if on looking we could see that they had none. Lenin's use of the phrase "he has a reflection in his mind" is such that, no matter what one suggests (other than the "indirect" test of success in practice), it is not to be accepted as a direct test for whether he has one (cf. there is an image in a mirror in the periscope), or as a direct test for the likeness of the image to the thing (cf. I observe, by looking from one to the other, that the image in the mirror is a good likeness of the things mirrored).

What ordinary people—housewives, workmen, scientists, and even philosophers—need for "success in practice" is to be able to distinguish when there is a material thing in their way from when there isn't, to distinguish a thing of one colour from a thing of another, a hallucination from really seeing a thing, and so on; but to be told that, when they see something, what is happening is that they have in their minds a reflection of the thing, will help them in no way—it will neither guide them in making this or destroying that, or in finding this or avoiding that, or in any other practical activity. What Lenin requires of philosophy is that it should deny neither established facts of science nor plain facts of common sense: but there are more ways of avoiding these than he was aware of, and certainly it is not necessary in order to do so to utter, as a theory believed by all and necessary to the success of their activities, what is little more than a figure of speech. And in doing so he can hardly claim the merit of not going beyond "the naïve realism of any healthy person, who is not an inmate of an insane asylum, or in the school of the idealist philosophers" (p. 47).

# FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT 'KNOW' AND 'THINK'

By AUSTIN E. DUNCAN-JONES

IN 'Some questions about "know" and "think"' (*Analysis*, 5, 3 and 4, May 1938) A. M. MacIver criticises the view that sentences of such forms as ' $p$  but I think not- $p$ ' are self-contradictory; he also criticises incidentally a remark which I made (*Analysis* 5.1, Oct. 1937) to the effect that 'I think  $p$  but not- $p$ ' is a "form of contradiction."

I don't propose to discuss MacIver's paper exhaustively, or to defend my own remark, which certainly needs elucidation: I propose to discuss two points in MacIver's paper on which I think he is undoubtedly mistaken.

MacIver starts by listing two sets, (A) and (B), of eight sentences each. I shall be obliged to reproduce his list (A), which is as follows.

- "(A) (1) ' $p$  is true but I know that it is not.'  
 (2) ' $p$  is true but I do not know that it is.'  
 (3) ' $p$  is true but I think that it is not.'  
 (4) ' $p$  is true but I have no opinion on the matter either way.'  
 (5) 'I know that  $p$  is true but I may be mistaken.'  
 (6) 'I think that  $p$  is true but I may be mistaken.'  
 (7) 'I know that  $p$  is true but I am aware that I may be mistaken.'  
 (8) 'I think that  $p$  is true but I am aware that I may be mistaken.'"

List (B) differs from (A) only in that in sentences (1) to (4) the phrase 'the editor of *Analysis*' is substituted for 'I', and the verb governed by 'I' is changed from the first to the third person: and that in (5) to (8) a corresponding change is made, except that the second 'I' is replaced by 'he'.

My first point is very simple. MacIver says (p. 43) that each of the sentences (A) (1-8) "*appears* to be self-contradictory." Here MacIver seems to have been led into an obvious mistake by excessive schematism. For (A) (6) and (8) don't even appear to be self-contradictory. If we use 'think' in the sense it would ordinarily have in this kind of context, 'I think that  $p$  is true' is, paradoxically, equivalent to 'I *am inclined* to

think  $p$  is true'. For instance 'I think the economic theory of the causes of the great war is true' is equivalent to 'the economic theory is the one which I am inclined to accept': and this statement almost calls for the addition 'but (I am aware that) I may be mistaken', which simply amplifies what has been said already. But was MacIver perhaps using 'think' in a peculiar sense?

I think it is just possible that he was. He distinguishes (pp. 43-4) two possible meanings of 'know': one, such that "A knows  $p$ ", always entails ' $p$ '; the other such that "A knows  $p$ " is merely equivalent to 'A is convinced of  $p$ '. It seems just possible that MacIver was treating 'think' as equivalent to 'know' in the second sense. Further on (pp. 46-7) he says "it would be said that 'Mussolini is having a bath' implies both 'I know that he is' and, *a fortiori*, 'I think that he is'". MacIver denies that 'Mussolini is having a bath' implies 'I know that he is': but he doesn't seem to question that if I know  $p$  then, *a fortiori*, I think  $p$ .<sup>1</sup> Yet obviously, if 'I think  $p$ ' is used in the colloquial way, as equivalent to 'I am inclined to think  $p$ ', it doesn't follow from 'I know  $p$ ' at all, but is inconsistent with it. Admittedly 'I think  $p$ ' might be used as a sort of emphatic meiosis by somebody who really felt quite sure of  $p$ : if, for instance, somebody said something I disagreed with, and I banged on the table and said '*I think not*', in an angry tone. But this is a freak usage. So if MacIver's statement that (A) (6) and (8) appear to be self-contradictory was not simply a blunder—if there are some sentences of similar form which he has good reason for saying appear self-contradictory—he should, I think, have chosen a different form of words.

My second point is more complicated and more interesting. Apart from the two sentences I have already discussed, I do not propose to raise the question whether the sentences in list (A) are self-contradictory. But I want to say something about an argument by which MacIver claims to show that certain of them are not. MacIver admits that certain (A) sentences, and the corresponding (B) sentences may be self-contradictory, at any rate on one interpretation: but he argues that each (A) sentence, if used by a certain person, expresses the same proposition as the corresponding (B) sentence, and that consequently, if a given

<sup>1</sup> Yet people often say 'I don't think; I know'.

(B) sentence is not self-contradictory, it follows that the corresponding (A) sentence is also not self-contradictory; and he argues that some of the (B) sentences, and therefore the corresponding (A) sentences, are in fact not self-contradictory.

MacIver describes a procedure of "translating" sentences containing pronouns (or "pronominal sentences") "into forms in which the pronouns are replaced by nouns" (pp. 44-5). When the pronoun in question is 'I,' this is done by substituting for 'I' the name or a description of the user of the sentence. The two sentences then "express the same proposition" (p. 46)—MacIver says this is "assumed"; but he doesn't seem to regard it as a questionable assumption): and "the meaning of the pronominal sentence as used on a particular occasion is not altered". Accordingly if one of MacIver's (A) sentences were uttered by the person who is in fact editor of *Analysis* it would express the same proposition and have the same meaning as the corresponding (B) sentence. Yet certain of the (B) sentences are quite obviously not self-contradictory, and it follows that the corresponding (A) sentences are also not self-contradictory.

Part of this argument is very plausible. It does seem natural to say that if two sentences express the same proposition, or have the same meaning, they must have the same modality (that is, both be self-contradictory, or necessary, or contingent). (MacIver does indeed say (p. 46) that "logical relations (such as contradiction)"—and therefore, I suppose, also logical characters, such as modality—apply to propositions, not to sentences. But as he frequently speaks of sentences contradicting one another, or being self-contradictory, I don't think this limitation need be taken very seriously. I shall assume that it will be generally intelligible to talk of modalities and logical relations, not only in relation to propositions, but also in relation to sentences, and I won't waste time by justifying or explaining this practice.) There may also be a certain temptation to say that 'I went to Grantchester yesterday' (to take MacIver's example, p. 45), as spoken by A, expresses the same proposition, and has the same meaning, as 'A went to Grantchester yesterday', said on the same day by somebody else. The two sentences would, with certain qualifications, convey the same information.

But these assumptions, and the conclusion which seems to follow, only seem plausible as long as we don't reflect on the

meaning of 'express the same proposition' or 'have the same meaning'. I propose to confine my attention to 'express the same proposition', which is slightly the simpler of the two. I hope to show that sentences of the types which MacIver says express the same proposition actually don't, if 'proposition' is used in the ordinary way. In that case one half of MacIver's argument breaks down. But my contention is not easy to prove, because the meaning of 'proposition' is not so precise and unambiguous, in the ordinary usage of philosophers, that a single simple criterion can be given for deciding whether two sentences express the same proposition. To take a simple and relevant example: it's permissible to talk about 'the proposition "I am hungry"': but it's also permissible to say that the sentence 'I am hungry' expresses different propositions when used by different people, or by the same person on different occasions. (MacIver's argument of course depends on using the word 'proposition' in the latter of these ways.) However, I shall also try to show that MacIver uses the word 'proposition' in such a way that two sentences may express the same proposition although they have not got the same modality, although, for instance, one is self-contradictory and the other is not. And in that case the other half of MacIver's argument breaks down.

MacIver holds that when a sentence containing the word 'I' is used by someone, say A, who is applying 'I' to himself, other sentences may be formed by substituting for 'I' A's name, or a definite description which stands for A, which will express the same proposition as the original sentence as used by A. He doesn't distinguish the cases in which he replaces 'I' by a name from those in which he replaces it by a description, so presumably either is always allowed. Presumably also the relation of expressing the same proposition is transitive; in which case different sentences, containing a name or different descriptions, all of which in fact apply to the same person, and which differ in no other way, will express the same proposition. MacIver also gives an example of replacing a word like 'yesterday' (p. 45) by a phrase standing for a definite date: but it will not be necessary for me to consider any pronominal expressions except the word 'I.'

(1) When '*p*' and '*q*' differ only in respect of their subject-expressions, we should not usually say that they express the same

proposition unless the two subject-expressions have the same meaning. If 'A' and 'B' are the subject-expressions, 'A is identical with B' must be an analytic proposition. For instance, 'the present king of England' does mean the same as 'the present occupant of the English throne', and we are therefore prepared to say that, for instance, 'the present king of England is fond of horses' expresses the same proposition as 'the present occupant of the English throne is fond of horses'. But we shouldn't say that either of these expresses the same proposition as 'the second son of George V is fond of horses'; and if the person who actually is king of England were to say 'I am fond of horses', we shouldn't say that the sentence he was using expressed the same proposition as any of the other sentences I have mentioned. (Of course in a way 'I' as used by the person who actually is king of England *has* the same meaning as 'the second son of George V', or 'the present king of England'—the same denotation, perhaps? But 'I am king of England' as used by the person who is king of England would not be an analytic but a synthetic proposition.) Or again, from 'the present king of England is not fond of horses' it certainly doesn't follow that 'the second son of George V is fond of horses' is false.

(2) The next point arises naturally from the first. Suppose '*p*', '*q*', and '*r*' are sentences which differ only in that '*p*' contains the word 'I', '*q*' contains the name of a person who has in fact used '*p*', and '*r*' contains a description which in fact applies to the person named in '*q*'. Then it is always logically possible, and often possible in practice, for someone to know the proposition expressed by '*p*', as used by the person in question, and not know the proposition expressed by '*q*' or the proposition expressed by '*r*'; or to know the proposition expressed by '*q*' but not that expressed by '*r*', or vice versa. (There is a certain difficulty about saying that he might know the proposition expressed by '*q*' or '*r*' but not that expressed by '*p*', to which I shall return later.) Suppose '*p*' is 'I live in Cambridge', '*q*' is 'Professor Moore lives in Cambridge', and '*r*' is 'the editor of *Mind* lives in Cambridge'. In that case, there probably are people who know the proposition expressed by '*q*' but don't know the proposition expressed by '*r*' and there may be people who know the proposition expressed by '*r*' but not that expressed by '*q*'. And if a stranger heard Professor Moore say '*p*' ('I



live in Cambridge'), in circumstances which gave no reason for doubting his statement, we should say that he knew the proposition which Professor Moore's words expressed, although perhaps he didn't know the proposition expressed by 'q' or by 'r'. According to MacIver, 'p', 'q', and 'r' would all express the same proposition. But we certainly don't use the word 'proposition' in such a way that the same person can at the same time both know and not know a certain proposition.

(3) MacIver confines his attention to proper names and descriptions which apply to some actual person. It is worth considering the position of descriptions which apply to nobody. On MacIver's view, the proposition expressed by 'the editor of *Mind* lives in Cambridge' can also be expressed by 'I live in Cambridge' as uttered by Professor Moore. But the proposition expressed by 'the editor of *Philosophical gossip* lives in Oxford' can't be expressed by 'I live in Oxford,' since, I presume, there is no one to utter this sentence. It is very strange if, in order to discover whether a proposition can be expressed in a certain form of words, we have to know whether it is true.

(4) There is a certain temptation to say that 'p', 'q', and 'r' (under heading (2) above) must express the same proposition, because they all refer to the same fact. In a sense of course they do—but only, I think, if this means the same completely determinate or 'non-general' fact. The non-general fact in question will have to be a very complicated fact, relating to every detail of somebody's life. But this fact will also be referred to by a great many other sentences, such as 'I caught the 9.30 train this morning', which nobody would dream of saying expressed the same proposition as 'p', 'q', or 'r'.

I think it would be very undesirable to say that they all refer to the same general fact; but I can't give reasons for this without a long and probably unprofitable discussion of the use of the word 'fact'.

But there is a closely related point which is worth mentioning. To say that 'p', 'q', and 'r' refer to the same fact might mean that they have to be verified in the same way. And this is patently false. The process of verifying 'p', 'q', and 'r' might well in practice be quite different, and must necessarily be partly different. I might, of course, verify both 'q' ('Professor Moore lives in Cambridge') and 'r' ('the editor of *Mind*

lives in Cambridge') by the single process of looking at a copy of *Mind* and seeing Professor Moore's address. But even then, one aspect of this process would be relevant only to '*q*' and another aspect would be relevant only to '*r*'. Thus, on MacIver's view, a holder of any form of the principle that 'the meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification' would have to admit that two sentences might have different meanings and yet express the same proposition. Of course if two sentences have different meanings we shall almost certainly also say that they express different propositions. And even apart from the verification principle there would probably be fairly wide agreement that if two sentences have to be verified in different ways it follows that they express different propositions.

I think these considerations make it fairly clear that sentences interrelated in the same way as '*p*', '*q*', and '*r*' in my example don't in any ordinary sense express the same proposition, but three different propositions. In that case MacIver is mistaken in arguing that each of his (A) sentences expresses the same proposition as the corresponding (B) sentence, and his proof that certain of his (A) sentences are not self-contradictory is therefore not valid. But if the foregoing considerations are not found convincing, there is another way of disproving MacIver's argument.

Consider the sentences (a) 'I am not an editor,' (b) 'Professor Moore is not an editor,' (c) 'the editor of *Mind* is not an editor.' Of these sentences, (c) is obviously self-contradictory, while (a) and (b) as obviously are not—and (a) would not be even if it were said by Professor Moore. Yet on MacIver's view (a), if uttered by Professor Moore, (b) and (c) must all express the same proposition. If a proposition has the same logical character as the sentences which express it, it follows that the same proposition may both be and not be self-contradictory. In any event, it follows that the same proposition may be expressed both by a self-contradictory and by a self-consistent sentence. In either case, it follows that even if each of MacIver's (A) sentences expresses the same proposition as the corresponding (B) sentence it is quite possible for one to be self-consistent and the other to be self-contradictory.

Enough has I think been said to show that MacIver's claim to prove that certain (A) sentences are not self-contradictory is

completely untenable, in so far as it rests on the argument that they express the same propositions as the corresponding (B) sentences, and that these are obviously not self-contradictory.

In the latter part of his paper, MacIver argues that the inclination to call sentences of such forms as ' $p$  but I think not- $p$ ' self-contradictory really arises from the fact that the saying of them must always be pointless: and that there really is a contradiction, not in the sentence, but "between part of what is asserted and what must be assumed by the hearer if the other part is to be worth attending to" (p. 50: the point is, I suppose, that the hearer must assume 'the speaker believes what he is saying', that is 'believes  $p$ ', and this conflicts with the speaker's statement 'I think not- $p$ '). This suggestion seems to be independent of the argument I have been criticising, and I don't feel at all sure that it is not the right account of what I previously called a "form of contradiction". I don't, however, feel quite sure that it is. MacIver accuses philosophers, especially "analytical" philosophers, of "considering language apart from its use" (p. 49). He adds the curious statement that, as a result, "'to have no use' tends to be equated with 'to make no sense'". I should have thought this would be a natural result, not of separating language from its use, but of considering it only in relation to its use. I can't help suspecting that MacIver is perhaps himself guilty of "considering language apart from its use", when he talks of the "pointlessness" of making a certain statement. I can only put this point very vaguely. MacIver attempts to distinguish between a proposition which is self-contradictory, and a proposition whose assertion is, from its own nature, pointless, because "there is a contradiction involved in the situation of *making* such an assertion": I have a suspicion that this distinction may rest on a fictitious separation of the properties which symbols possess 'in themselves', and the practical purposes for which they can be used in different kinds of situation. I recognise that this fiction, if it is a fiction, is probably just as deep-rooted in my own mind as it is in MacIver's.

There is an incidental point connected with the interchangeability of pronouns, names, and descriptions which is interesting. When I was trying to show that sentences containing pronouns don't express the same propositions as corresponding sentences containing names or descriptions, there is another argument

which I might have used. Pronouns and their equivalents work, as symbols, in a different way from descriptions and proper names.<sup>2</sup> In an obvious sense—quite different from Russell's—a pronominal sentence is an incomplete symbol: it can't be understood unless it is completed in some way by circumstances. In an equally obvious sense a non-pronominal sentence is complete in itself. It might be argued that a complete and an incomplete symbol could never express the same proposition, and that accordingly none of MacIver's (B) sentences can express the same proposition as any of his (A) sentences. But could any reason be given for this principle except that in fact no instance of a complete and an incomplete symbol which express the same proposition can be found? If this is the only reason which could be given, the argument is circular. For it presupposes that a criterion already exists for deciding whether '*p*' and '*q*' express the same proposition: it can't therefore be used in establishing such a criterion.

I feel, however, that there is some additional ground for saying that a complete and an incomplete symbol can't express the same proposition, but I don't know whether I can justify this feeling. Suppose '*p*' and '*q*' are sentences which differ only in that '*p*' contains '*I*' and '*q*' contains a name or description standing for somebody who has in fact used '*p*'. It might be argued that if '*p*' and '*q*' expressed the same proposition it should be possible for anyone who knew the language to which '*p*' and '*q*' belong to use either '*p*' or '*q*' indifferently: but actually '*q*' can be used by anyone, while '*p*' can only be used, to convey the same information, by one person. But compare this case with a slightly different case. Suppose there were a symbolism which involved writing characters in different colours. Suppose '*p*' involved the use of a red character, and '*q*' didn't. I might then be able to write '*q*', but unable to write '*p*' because I had no red ink. But we clearly shouldn't regard this as a sufficient reason for saying '*p*' and '*q*' couldn't express the same proposition. We feel, however, that in this case the impossibility of my using '*p*' is accidental; whereas in the former case the impossibility of my using '*p*', if I

<sup>2</sup> I think Russell was right, as far as he went, in saying that ordinary proper names were equivalent to descriptions; but that isn't very far. It was confusing to say that we attach different descriptions to them on different occasions; for obviously in some sense they mean the same for everyone.

were not the person named or described in 'q', would be essential.

I argued above, under (2), that someone might know the proposition expressed by a pronominal sentence without knowing the proposition expressed by a corresponding non-pronominal sentence; but suggested that there was a difficulty about saying that someone might know the proposition expressed by the non-pronominal sentence without knowing that expressed by the pronominal sentence. The difficulty is that he might know the proposition expressed by 'q' (used as above) but not understand the proposition expressed by 'p': it would of course follow that in one sense he didn't know the proposition expressed by 'p'—because he couldn't know it: but in a different sense from that in which he doesn't know a proposition which he does understand, and could know. It might be argued that 'p' can be understood only by those who hear it—if it's spoken—because the speaker is himself part of the symbolism. The complete symbol of which the incomplete symbol 'p' is part can't be reported, as complete verbal symbols can. It can of course be described and imagined, and so, in a sense, understood by those who didn't hear it. But in another sense it can't be understood. When I understand a non-pronominal sentence, the complete symbol is before me. But when I understand an 'I' sentence, as spoken on some occasion on which I wasn't present, only part of the symbol is before me, and part is merely imagined.

I raise these points about 'incomplete symbols' simply for the sake of suggesting certain puzzles, not with the intention of putting forward any positive view. Similar puzzles can of course be found for other reported pronominal sentences—compare, for instance, the reported sentence 'this colour is darker than that'.

University of Birmingham  
July 1938

## THE ANALYSIS SOCIETY

The postponed meeting will be held in London on 8 and 9 January, 1939. The subject for discussion will be 'Philosophical aspects of dialectical materialism'. Members of the Society are invited to submit papers on this subject, for presentation at the meeting and publication in one of the forthcoming numbers of *Analysis*. Papers by non-members will also be considered. Intending contributors are asked to communicate with the editor of *Analysis* without delay, and are reminded that papers should be as short as possible.



